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Invited to write “a manifesto for [my] own theological position”, I
begin with science and human rights as excellent examples of
universalist aspirations of modernity. Modern individualism is
important too, as particular existential loves shape each life.
Science, morality, and personal loves are interwoven in theologies,
as creative constructions. The sciences are important, as we need
not only individual authenticity but also accountability. My
position presented here is science-inspired naturalistic theism. It is
not “religious naturalism”, given the categorical difference
between facts and values. It is not “natural theology”, as inductive
approaches do not reach that far. It comes closer to a “theology
of nature”, but it does not assume the epistemic claims involved. I




G. Frankfurt; Clifford Geertz;
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Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more
often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law
within me.—Immanuel Kant1
At the end of his Critique of Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant wrote of two awe-inspiring
themes: nature and morality, two domains in which our aspirations are universal. Existen-
tially, each of us lives an individual, specific life; my particular “loves” shape my life. Those
three issues, science, morality, and particular loves, come together in my understanding of
theology. The editors of Theology and Science, Robert J. Russell and Ted Peters, invited me
to write “a manifesto for your own theological position with special reference to the role
science plays in your thinking”. I am most grateful for this invitation, which stimulated
self-reflection, just as I have always been looking back with gratitude upon a semester
at the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences (CTNS), 30 years ago, in 1987.2
Modern aspirations include knowledge and values which are universal; such aspirations
have been realized to a large extent in the natural sciences and in human rights. Concep-
tually, the modern orientation appreciates also human diversity. Each of us cares about
particular humans, and not just about humankind. We join a particular religious commu-
nity, if we do, and we share in its practices and convictions. Drawing for my understanding
of religion on a definition by anthropologist Clifford Geertz, I take it that in a theology our
worldview and our ethos may be interwoven, drawing on the resources of a particular
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heritage. A theology thus expresses what one takes the world to be, what one would like the
world to be, and what is existentially important to oneself. Authenticity is an important
criterion, but accountability—relative to the best available science and the most funda-
mental human rights—is important too.
At the end of my reflections, I will explain the following answers to questions posed to
me by the editors: “Is your position religious naturalism?” NO. “Is it natural theology or
theology of nature?” NEITHER. “Something else?” YES! Theologies are human construc-
tions, just as human culture and society are, and as constructions, they express something
very important.
Enlightenment and secularity: universalism and individualism
Amodern orientation rooted in the European Enlightenment, as I see it, combines univer-
sal ambitions about knowledge, morality, and politics, with awareness of historicity, of the
contingent character of social, cultural and biological reality, and with a critical attitude
towards traditional sources of moral and epistemic authority. The natural sciences and
the moral claims articulated as universal human rights have been fairly successful in
their global appeal. Aspirations went beyond practice, for instance with respect to the pos-
ition of women and of persons of non-European backgrounds. Whether we failed those
ambitions or are heading in the desired direction, as I hope in my more optimistic
moments, the universal aspirations with respect to knowledge (science) and morality I
consider to be indicative of deep values.
The dream of a universal language such as Esperanto, a language that would not be the
language of any particular culture, failed, and so have visions of a world government or a
global religion. Rightly so; some ambitions are too minimalist to live by. Humans are
diverse in their ways of living, and this diversity is to be respected and appreciated.
Thus, the modern orientation involves a conceptual individualism or liberalism. This
need not imply social individualism, as humans freely choose to live and work with others.
Whereas the Enlightenment agenda is from the eighteenth century, European countries
such as the Netherlands have shown a further shift towards secularity in recent decades.
Secularization should not be understood as merely numerical change, less people in the
pews, though that is part of the story. More fundamental, in my opinion, is that what it
means to be religious has changed.3 This might be described as a move “from Authority
to Authenticity”. Very schematically, in earlier times one used to be born as Roman Catho-
lic, Anglican, Reformed, or whatever, and almost all stayed within the church into which
they were born and raised. In the context of one’s community, a particular external auth-
ority—whether the Pope or the Bible as understood by the ministers of one’s church—was
a given. Those who did not have a religious framework, also belonged to a particular social
movement—say as social democrats or as communists—and with that came identity,
safety and a sense of duty. One might speak of this—schematically exaggerated earlier situ-
ation—with a philosophical term as heteronomy, as the law (nomos) was given from
outside. The term might be understood more easily when contrasted with its modern
counterpart, autonomy, the law is set by oneself. By way of contrast, the more recent
mood can be described as a turn towards individualism.
With the emphasis on the individual, the norm seems to have become “authenticity”;
one has to choose whatever fits best who one really is or aspires to be, in one’s relations,































one’s work, one’s hobbies, and one’s religious engagement. Religion has become a chosen
orientation. Even those who claim to return to the purity of their religious tradition,
whether in an evangelical Christian commitment or as radical Islamists, do so as their per-
sonal choice. In the Protestant Reformation, the call to return to the sources, ad fontes, of
early Christianity evoked study to find out what early Christianity really had been. Bypass-
ing such scholarship, current radicals have elected to accept the authority of a tradition on
the basis of their invented interpretation or of a leader who seems to them most authentic.
We see changing sources of authority, a shift away from a given community and its estab-
lished leadership to the individual and the person’s immediate friends and acquaintances,
even when those immediate relationships are globalized, maintained via modern communi-
cation technologies. It is not that “spiritual seekers”, say adherents of New Age, Paganism
and the like, are less engaged socially and ethically than members of traditional churches,
though there is a slight shift towards environmental causes versus social justice issues.4 It
is not primarily moral engagement or “spiritual belief” that has changed, but the sources
of authority people appeal to. A new voice from a religious organization such as Pope
Francis may well attract attention, but that is not so much because he speaks for the
tradition, as it is because he is seen as authentic, an individual of interest. This is not
individualism, in the sense that people do not care about communities and friends. It is con-
ceptual—the individual is the primary unit, rather than a given community or tradition.
So far on three fundamental elements in my orientation: respect for science, for human
rights, and for individuals shaping their own lives. I consider as allies skeptics and others
who are critical of external authorities and claims that conflict with science. But what
insights does science provide, and what is not entailed by respect for science?
The natural sciences
The natural sciences are extremely successful, precise, reliable and complete. An example of
well-established science is chemistry, with its Periodic Table of the Elements, a scheme
beginning with hydrogen and helium. One finds this scheme in many classrooms. All
things in the visibleUniverse seem to bemade of the elements represented there. It embodies
knowledge that is used every day in material sciences, pharmacology, and elsewhere. With
quantum physical models of atoms, the scheme can be understood; thus, chemistry and
physics are unified. The Periodic Table is the same in Japan, Russia, and across the globe.
Not only is it culturally invariant in use; it also is the fruit of work of chemists from many
different cultural backgrounds. And if we ever were to encounter extra-terrestrial scientists
who deal with matter under similar circumstances, I expect that their understanding will be
similar, even though the names and symbols for the elements will be different.
Do we know what matter is, then? Atoms consist of a nucleus with protons and neu-
trons, surrounded by electrons. Those protons and neutrons consist of quarks, held
together by gluons. At least, that is currently the best model at that physics level of descrip-
tion. And as we go further down, different ideas have been proposed. Perhaps matter
should be understood as vibrating strings in a higher dimensional space, as superstring
theories envisage. We are not there yet in our quest to understand matter; we have not
hit rock bottom. Future theories may well change our understanding of reality, though
pragmatically, current theories such as the knowledge represented by the Periodic Table
will remain useful.































That future theories will be different, should make us cautious when we draw philoso-
phical conclusions. Current theories may also have multiple interpretations as to what
they mean. Many readers may be aware of this for quantum physics, but it applies as
well to other theories. Various interpretations of a fundamental theory have equal stand-
ing, presenting ways the world might be, according to that theory. Thus, alongside the
great success of science, there is an open side to it, especially when it comes to metaphys-
ical consequences, our worldview. Experiments constrain but underdetermine our the-
ories, the theories are not final even when they are adequate at their level of
description, and our theories allow for multiple interpretations.
Science is awe inspiring for what it delivers. Denying consolidated science is an intel-
lectual disaster. It is also a moral and political failure. It may keep established knowledge
and useful therapies away from vulnerable people, e.g. when the relation between HIV and
AIDS is denied, and may result in less than adequate policies, for instance when human
induced climate change is dismissed. Denying scientific insights may serve particular com-
mercial interests, at the expense of interests of future generations. We should accept scien-
tific insights as knowledge about the world.
At the same time, science is not final. Let me express this with an image from the phi-
losopher Karl Popper.5
Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were,
above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above
into the swamp, but not down to any natural or “given” base; and if we stop driving the piles
deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied
that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.
We can build, and we can drive the pillars deeper, but there is no absolute foundation. None-
theless, as the city of Amsterdam shows, one can have a great city build on such human-
made foundations. In fundamental physics, experts seek to drive the pillars deeper by
inventing deeper theories. In other branches of physics and in the life sciences, colleagues
are expanding the structure, using the best available current theories. Thus, while we do
not really know what nature is like, deep down, we have well established, expanding knowl-
edge at more mundane levels of existence. Science is a human product, with all the historical,
social contingencies involved, but at the same time, science delivers insights that surpass
human preferences and biases, individually, culturally and collectively.6
Though science is the prime source of reliable knowledge about the world, science does
not have the answer to everything, nor will future science ever have the answer to every-
thing. As mentioned earlier, there may well be multiple interpretations of the scientific
theories involved. Besides, any scientific explanation of a phenomenon—say the
weather today—involves assumptions about a preceding state—the weather yesterday—
and about the natural laws that describes the dynamics of the system, in this case atmos-
pheric physics. Science cannot explain without assumptions. Questions about “ultimate
origins” and the ultimate rationality of reality are beyond science, even though the way
such questions are framed, of course, always draw on the best available current scientific
insights. “Why is there something rather than nothing?” and “Why is the world math-
ematically rational?” are limit questions that arise in the context of scientific research,
but are not answerable by science.7 Last but not least, some issuess are categorically differ-
ent. Mathematical knowledge is different from scientific knowledge. More important for
my reflections here, moral values are of a different kind too.
































Kant made universalizability the basic criterion for morality: “So act that the maxim of
your will could always hold at the same time as principle in a giving of universal law”.8
Actual behavior, and justifications people offer, are, of course, often far more partisan,
driven by the interests of oneself or one’s family at the expense of others. That is to be
expected for living beings, given what we know of evolution.
How can we envisage morality with its universal aspirations, in a world that was shaped
by evolution?We can understand the emergence of a human practice of making normative
evaluations, judging others. In a group, we profit from pro-social behavior of others. This
may be reinforced culturally, for instance by religious practices and beliefs.9
Is it merely a pragmatic issue—it works for the group? Can moral arguments be justi-
fied, and not merely be explained? Criteria such as disinterestedness and universalizability
may be understood in the context of our evolutionary past. Perhaps, one day a hominid
was asked by another hominid something equivalent to: “Why did you do that?”
Others may have been present. Emotions would not serve as an answer, nor would self-
interest. The justification of one’s behavior would have to be sufficiently general to be
recognizable to all. The application of criteria such as disinterestedness in the moral delib-
eration of many people together may have been important for the credibility of morality,
as recommending practices that go beyond what is psychologically “natural”.
And to justify the “transcendental” validity of moral norms, one might argue along
Kantian lines, for instance justifying values in the conditions for agency or judgement.10
Anyhow, without further argument in the context of this short paper, I acknowledge that
morality is made by humans, but in its aspirations, its claim to value, morality categorically
transcends us.
Loves: values in existence
I am convinced of the importance of human rights, for all humans, whether I like them or
not. However, I care existentially about my wife, my children and various specific others.
SusanWolf made a distinction between “reasons of love” and reasons that would qualify as
moral or selfish.11
When I visit my brother in the hospital, or help my friend move, or stay up all night sewing
my daughter a Halloween costume, I act neither for egoistic reasons not for moral ones. (…)
Rather, I act out of love.
It may be accidental why my life has become interwoven with precisely these fellow
humans, but my relation to them is important to who I am. And so too for certain pursuits,
that are important to me, that make me who I am. My language. The stories that inspire
me. The way I celebrate and the way I mourn. The way I relate to my family, the legacy I
received. And to my country. Such “loves” and other markers of identity are my way of
being in the world. I never speak “language”; it is always a particular language.
Adherents of a religion do not believe in “religion”, but are involved in a particular tra-
dition, with its rituals and stories, its community and its convictions. How might we, then,
honor universal ambitions in knowledge and in morality jointly with the plurality of par-
ticular identities, individually and collectively? We will consider this, with a focus on reli-
gions and theologies.
































To approach the concept of religion, let us consider two dimensions of theism, which
forms the background of much of our discourse on religion in general. Firstly, in
theism God is understood to be the Creator of all that exists, a necessary being who is
not dependent upon anything else for existence. Drawing on this example, one might con-
clude that a religion provides a frame to speak of ultimate cosmological, metaphysical
questions regarding existence.
Secondly, in theistic discourse God is the ultimate judge. Religions articulate the possi-
bility of evaluating our behavior from an impartial perspective that transcends all human
interests and biases. A religious view offers stories and symbols that help us speak of
values, of the axiological dimension of existence.
In a religion, these two dimensions—the cosmological and the axiological one—are
intertwined. This understanding of religion is in line with Clifford Geertz’s anthropologi-
cal definition of religions as systems of symbols that shape moods and motivations (the
axiological side of things) by presenting us with an understanding of reality (the cosmo-
logical dimension) that is taken as true, thus supporting those moods and motivations.12
Religions intertwine models of the world and models for the world. To use theism once
more as example: speaking of God as creator might integrate an idea about the ground
of existence with an attitude of gratitude, humility, and respect for fellow creatures.
On the cosmological side, the models of the world, religions express aspects of our
understanding of the world, and hence in our time should relate to science. On the
basis of experiences and experiments, people have developed theories. Theories are
mostly hypotheses, and not generalizations of data—and those hypotheses might be
tested on the basis of the predictions that can be deduced from them. Theories, and
more encompassing worldviews, are thus underdetermined by data, even though data
may constrain the range of possible theories or worldviews. On the axiological side, the
models for the world, there is a similar upward movement from personal preferences to
general, abstract moral discourse, supported by ethics as philosophical analysis. This
too might go far beyond what is included in “the data”, the underlying preferences and
experiences.
Worldviews and values are intertwined in religious views and practices. When these go
beyond symbols and stories, and are articulated in a systematic fashion, I would speak of
theologies. Thus, someone’s theology is an integration of those two trajectories, of a vision
for reality and an understanding of reality. It is an integration that draws on the particular
resources available as legacy received and expresses the particular loves and concerns of
the individual.13
And if speaking of theology as integration suggests too much an intellectual project, one
might also consider it more pragmatically. The question is how to think of the coexistence
of two major but different human activities—science and morality—, working together for
a common good. Working together may respect differences in kind and status. The main
concern then might be to understand the good, and the factors that help promote “the
good”, as the opposite of “good” is all too often a disappointed “intended well”.
Even if the driving ambition is “practical” (social, moral), we need critical intellectual
consideration. Using the best available knowledge is a matter of intellectual honesty
and of moral responsibility, as beliefs may have consequences. This responsibility is































well illustrated in the essay by the mathematician William K. Clifford (1879), “The Ethics
of Belief”, and the response by William James (1896), The Will to Believe, which better
could have been titled “The Right to Believe”, as James argues that under certain con-
ditions where there is insufficient evidence, it is still legitimate to decide to hold a particu-
lar belief.14
Howmight science and religion work together for a common good? Science is primarily
a source of understanding,models of reality, and through technology a source of power, the
ability to modify reality. Scientific practice also provides a model for good collaboration
and for rational operation, and hence a normative example. Religions primarily provide
stories and visions, models for reality. They could also help us reflect on the “human con-
dition”, individual and collective. One might hope that religions provide normative and
inspiring examples, but given embarrassing examples from people who have religious
offices or justify violence with religious motives, this exemplary role should be treated cau-
tiously, if at all.
What might scholars in “religion and science”, contribute today? The particular intel-
lectual niche, it seems to me, is to engage and nourish science and the intellectual ambition
that comes by engagement with science, also in domains such as history, anthropology,
psychology, the study of religions and the like. Not by dismissing human existential
quests, as the new atheism seems to do, but neither by allowing “self-invented” varieties
of science to stand for genuine science. The aim should be to bring a genuine scientific
orientation to the table in the human, individual and communal discourses about our exis-
tential orientations and moral responsibilities, encouraging a constructive and critical
reflection on worldviews and values.
Science-inspired naturalism
The editors invited me to label my position: Is it religious naturalism, natural theology, a
theology of nature, or something else?
I have used the word naturalism in the title of one of my books, Religion, Science and
Naturalism. Some have thus considered me a religious naturalist. However, that is not
what I consider myself. I do consider myself a science-inspired naturalist, in the sense
that when it comes to knowledge of the world, the sciences are our prime source of under-
standing nature; there is no ground to expect exceptions, whether as aura’s, angels, or
miracles that go against nature. If something surprising is noticed, the aim will be to
understand it in a way consistent with science, and thus to develop science.
However, in various publications I also pointed out that such a science-inspired natur-
alism does not answer limit questions about ultimate origins, and thus does not address
the cosmological dimension of religion—illustrated earlier with the theistic image of
God as creator. Nor does it deal with the categorically different kind of insight that is
typical of mathematics, and even less with moral values. With respect to religious natur-
alisms, a major concern is that these tend to root values in “nature”, the “nature” that is
studied by science or experienced personally. Of course, functional human values are
rooted in our biological and cultural existence, and thus in nature, but whether those
values should be valued, seems to me to be a question that highlights the categorically dis-
tinct, “transcendental” character of values; their actuality in our natural and cultural reality
is not by itself enough evidence. Too often, humans have praised others with an appeal to































what is natural and criticized what is considered “counter-natural”. On the basis of reflec-
tion on human rights, later generations challenged such value judgements, and rightly so.
Thus, a religious naturalism that seeks to ground values in nature as understood by the
sciences, in my opinion bypasses philosophical insights about the distinction between
facts and values, between what is and what should be.15
What about natural theology? In this line of thinking, the main ambition seems to me to
support conclusions about the existence and attributes of the deity, to draw on the title of a
book by William Paley.16 The line of reasoning is by and large inductive, from obser-
vations to conclusions. However, those conclusions are beyond reach. I already mentioned
underdetermination—the theory does not follow from the data—, the plurality of possible
interpretations, and the possibility of future theories that will be rather different in ontol-
ogy, even though there will be continuity in a pragmatic sense. Thus, the “upward” line of
reasoning in natural theology pretends more than is given to us humans.
Naturalistic theism as a theology of nature?
What about theology of nature? As Ian Barbour used these terms, a “theology of nature
does not start from science, as some versions of natural theology do. Instead, it starts
from a religious tradition based on religious experience and historical revelation. But it
holds that some traditional doctrines need to be reformulated in the light of current
science.”17 Thus, the domains are relatively independent. Moral and existential dimen-
sions are relatively independent, but not the understanding of reality. But that too is recog-
nized here, as the sciences do constrain the options, or at least, make it desirable to
reformulate and perhaps reconsider traditional doctrines.
Currently, my preferred version of a theology of nature, relative to the scientific under-
standing, would emphasize God’s transcendence. God is transcendent to natural pro-
cesses, which are understood as dynamics within the created order. In publications I
have spoken of “a more transcendent God”, of “naturalistic theism”, and of “the divine
as ground of existence and of transcendental values.”18
Perhaps the distinction between creation as temporal and the divine as timeless might
help articulate the difference.19 As I see it, a science-inspired naturalist can advocate a nat-
uralistic theism; in this, the philosophical-theological tradition of Christianity (e.g. Anselm,
Augustine) could be engaged. It would offer a way to interpret the transcendental character
of mathematical truth and moral ideals as well as “answer” the limit questions. Of course,
some of the reformulations proposed might be such that various adherents of the Christian
tradition would consider it going too far, but that is a matter of further dispute.
In the structure of reasoning, any theology of nature that openly acknowledges that the
theological proposal does not follow from science, but merely is supposed to be consistent
with it, is somewhat akin to a hypothetical-deductive pattern of reasoning: the theory goes
beyond the data, as a creative proposal, but can be tested for its consistency with data, old
and new.
My main concern about a theology of nature is the status given to the creative proposal.
Or, rather, to such a theology’s sources: tradition, religious experience, historical revel-
ation, and such as Barbour has it in the passage quoted earlier. Given my appreciation
of the role of science as way of approaching reality, I do not see how a category of revel-
ation as a stable source of knowledge can be incorporated. I do see a place for the































vocabulary of revelation, for instance when someone says that this “was a revelation to
me”. Something has become clear. It may even be a title of honor, just as the word
miracle—my children are “miracles” to me.
If we look at religious traditions through the eyes of historians and scholars of religion,
we see human movements. Their key figures, such as Siddhārtha Gautama, Jesus of Nazar-
eth, and Muh ammad ibn ʿAbdullāh, are all humans, just like you and me. They may have
been particularly insightful and revealed important existential messages to fellow humans,
but epithets such as the Buddha, the Christ, or the Prophet are best understood as honori-
fic titles, given by humans, and not as terms that set them apart from the natural, human
community.
Theologies as expressive constructions, interweaving knowledge, values,
and loves
Theologies are human constructions. This does not set them apart as fictions, as construc-
tions can be very real. Our whole world is full of human constructions, such as cities and
computers. Social life is shaped by constructions, such as money and the state. Technology
and culture are the two major spheres of life which are nothing but constructions, and as
such very real. Science is a human construction as well, one tested against the world, in a
way that makes it the best model for knowledge that is as objective as possible. Human
rights are constructions too, but I see them as our best hope for a world in which all
humans are treated fairly.
Theologies are constructions of a different kind. A plurality of voices is unavoidable,
because theologies not only take into account our understanding of reality and our
values, but also our more particular loves, the heritage that might be dear to us, the reper-
toire of stories that we use to educate and motivate, the music that moves us, the language,
the rituals and symbols we might use. In theologies, we express in symbolic language our
ideas on reality and values, universal and personal. The claims might be compared to con-
victions in a personal relationship. “My wife is the loveliest”, is something I can say,
expressing my commitment and experience. This would not conflict with someone else
making a similar pronouncement about another person.
In the end, I consider myself an agnostic on ultimate metaphysical issues, the ground of
values and of existence; I do not think that we can reach that high. As a wondering human
reflecting on “the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me” (to return to
Kant’s motto), I find science-inspired naturalistic theism as described earlier personally
attractive. As I see it, for all practical purposes one does wise to take a science-inspired
naturalistic stance in daily life, e.g. when needing medical assistance. I consider Kantian
constructivism our best hope when it comes to philosophical justification of values.
And as a wandering human, living his life, I appreciate the motivating power of religious
narratives that integrate ethos and worldview, and especially some of the Christian para-
bles and hymns that stayed with me from my liberal protestant upbringing.20
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8. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 164 [Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 5:30]
9. The literature on morality and evolution is extensive; I made my initial summary in Willem
B. Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
204–210, 213–221. A fairly recent articulation has been offered by Philip Kitcher, The Ethical
Project (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
10. This was developed well in a recent PhD thesis by Sem de Maagt, Constructing Morality:
Transcendental Arguments in Ethics (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2017), drawing on the
work of Alan Gewirth and Christine M. Korsgaard.
11. Susan Wolf,Meaning in Life and Why It Matters (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2010), 4. Similarly, Harry G. Frankfurt, Reasons of Love (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2004). On this topic, I learned much from a PhD candidate of mine, Annemarie (M.J.)
van Stee, who defended her thesis Understanding Existential Self-Understanding: Philosophy
meets Cognitive Neuroscience on June 21, 2017, at Leiden University, the Netherlands.
12. Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Anthropological Approaches to the Study
of Religion, ed. M. Banton (London: Travistock, 1996); reprinted in Clifford Geertz, The
Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 1–46; see for my proposal,
Willem B. Drees, Religion and Science in Context: A Guide to the Debates (London: Routle-
dge, 2010), esp. chapters 1, 4 and 7.
13. In a different context, I found a version of “pragmatic expressivism” in Jeffrey Stout, Democ-
racy and Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 184, when he speaks of
democratic social practices “as a tradition with which we have good reasons to identify”.
14. William K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” in Lectures and Essays, Volume II, eds. L. Stephen
and F. Pollock (London: Macmillan, 1879), 177–211; William James, The Will to Believe and
Other Essays on Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover, 1956 [orig. 1896]).
15. On religious naturalism, three major articulations of my position have been explicit in the
rejection of “religious naturalism” as descriptive of my position: Willem B. Drees, “Religious
Naturalism and Science,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, eds. Philip
Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 108–123; Drees,
“Math, Morality, and Mystery: Naturalistic Varieties of Transcendence,” in Naturalism































and Beyond: Religious Naturalism and Its Alternatives, eds. Niels Henrik Gregersen and
Mikael Stenmark (Leuven: Peeters, 2016), 153–166; and Drees, “Religious Naturalism and
its Near Neighbors: Some Live Options,” in The Routledge Handbook of Religion and
Science, eds. Donald Crosby and Jerome Stone (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
16. William Paley, Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity Col-
lected from the Appearances of Nature (London, 1802).
17. Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues (New York: Harper,
1997), 100; identical in Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science (New York: Harper & Row,
1990), 26.
18. In Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism (1996), chapter 31 is titled “A more transcendent
God?”; “naturalistic theism” is a label I used in “Religious Naturalism and Science,” in The
Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science (2006). See also Willem B. Drees, “The Divine
as Ground of Existence and of Transcendental Values: An Exploration,” in Alternative Con-
cepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine, eds. Andrei A. Buckareff and Yujin
Nagasawa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 195–212.
19. Willem B. Drees, “A Case Against Temporal Critical Realism? Consequences of Quantum
Cosmology for Theology,” in Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature: Scientific Perspec-
tives on Divine Action, eds. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and C. J. Isham (Vatican
City State: Vatican Observatory Publications, and Berkeley, CA: Center for Theology and the
Natural Sciences, 1993), 331–365.
20. The distinction between wandering humans (and the need for particular narratives) and won-
dering humans (and philosophical speculation) I introduced in the final section of Religion,
Science and Naturalism, pp. 274–283.
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